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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brian Elliott Hogue appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for 
the appointment of counsel, motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and motion for a hearing. 
Mr. Hogue asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hogue pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft, felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 18-2407(1), and one count of issuing a check without funds, felony, in violation 
of I.C. § 18-3106(a). (R., pp.11, 17; see generally No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012.)1 The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with five years fixed, for the 
grand theft count, and a concurrent fixed sentence of three years for the issuing a check 
without funds count. (R., pp.12, 17.) Later, the district court denied Mr. Hague's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., pp.9-13, 17-19.) Mr. Hogue 
then appealed the district court's sentencing decision, which the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed. State v. Hogue, No. 40005, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 530 (Idaho 
Ct. App. June 10, 2013). 
Meanwhile, Mr. Hogue filed, pro se, a Notice of Pro Se Defendant. (R., pp.20-
21.) In the notice, he asked the district court to appoint counsel to aid him in his 
defense. (R., p.20.) 
Mr. Hogue also filed, prose, a timely Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R., pp.22-
33.) In the motion, Mr. Hogue asserted that his plea of guilty was not knowing or 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the record and transcript filed in 
Mr. Hague's prior appeal, Supreme Court Docket No. 40005. (R., p.2.) 
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voluntary. (R., pp.22-23.) He asserted that his plea was not knowing or voluntary 
because, while he was in custody at the Ada County Jail for fourteen months, he had 
been routinely denied access to counsel, his legal documents and legal mail were 
withheld from him, and his attorneys did not bring the denial of access to counsel or 
withholding of legal documents to the attention of the district court, despite his requests 
that they do so. (R., p.23.) Mr. Hogue had been placed on a "Behavior Modification 
Plan" while he was at the Ada County Jail. (R., pp.23, 28.) In an email to Mr. Hague's 
trial counsel, an officer at the jail stated that, "At this time, [Mr. Hogue] may not use the 
telephone and does not have any writing materials or any of his personal property." 
(R., pp.23, 28.) Mr. Hogue asserted that "[t]his was [meant] to impede [Mr. Hague's] 
defense and violated his Constitutional rights under the Idaho State Constitution and the 
United States Constitution." (R., pp.23-24.) He also asserted that his attorneys had 
rendered ineffective assistance, and that he had been prejudiced thereby, "[w]hen his 
counsel [failed] to [either] correct the violation of [Mr. Hogue's] rights or to notify the 
Court of the violation and seek relief." (R., p.24.) 
Mr. Hogue further asserted that the timing of the behavior modification plan was 
suspect, because the plan started at approximately the same time Mr. Hogue came 
under investigation for possession of sexual exploitative materials in a separate case. 
(R., pp.23-24; see R., pp.12, 17.)2 The behavior modification plan "was used as an 
[explanation] by Boise PD Detective Wade Spain as why [Mr.] Hogue could not be 
served with notice of a search warrant" in the separate case. (R., p.24; see R., pp.31-
32.) 
2 In the separate case, Mr. Hogue eventually pleaded guilty to one count of possession 
of sexually exploitative materials, in violation of I.C. § 18-1507(A). (R., p.23.) 
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Additionally, Mr. Hogue asserted that, given the "harsh treatment" he endured at 
the Ada County Jail and his pre-existing mental health issues, "it is [extremely likely] 
that [Mr. Hague's competency] at the time of his entry [of] plea may have been 
diminished." (R., p.25.) 
In sum, Mr. Hogue asserted that his "having been denied access to his 
attorney . . . and legal mail for such a prolonged period of time makes his plea 
impossible to be knowing or [voluntary]." (R., p.25.) "The fact that [Mr. Hague's] rights 
were violated to such a degree and his counsel did nothing to correct the issue 
[demonstrate Mr. Hague's counsel's] representation was ineffective and makes 
[Mr. Hague's] plea of guilty not [voluntary] or knowing." (R., p.25.) Thus, Mr. Hogue 
essentially requested that the district court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and 
schedule a trial. (See R., p.26.) He also requested a hearing if the motion were denied 
for any reason. (R., p.26.) 
The district court later issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Motions to Appoint Counsel, Withdraw Guilty Plea, and Set a Hearing.3 (R., pp.34-40.) 
With respect to Mr. Hague's request for the appointment of counsel, the district court 
explained that "[a] needy criminal defendant has a right to counsel at public expense at 
all critical stages of the criminal process." (R., p.36.) "A person is considered 'needy,' 
for purposes of appointment of counsel at public expense, if he or she is unable to pay 
for representation. I.C. § 19-851 (C). This determination usually requires an affidavit of 
financial means." (R., p.36.) The district court then denied Mr. Hague's motion for the 
appointment of counsel, after finding that he "has failed to submit any affidavit, sworn or 
3 In the memorandum decision and order, the district court also denied Mr. Hague's pro 
se Motion for Declaration of Mistrial/Dismissal (R., pp.41-43), because "the defendant 
pied guilty as part of a plea bargain; no trial was held." (R., p.34.) 
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unsworn, to the effect that he is indigent," and that at one point he had hired private 
counsel. (R., p.36.) Thus, "the Court lacks sufficient evidence from which to determine 
whether [Mr. Hogue] is 'needy' as defined in i.C. § 19-851 (C)." (R., p.36.) 
The district court then stated, "Even if [Mr. Hogue] were needy, the court could 
still deny appointment of counsel if the motion 'is not a proceeding that a reasonable 
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is 
therefore a frivolous proceeding."' (R., p.37 (quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3); State v. Wade, 
125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994)).) The district court determined that Mr. Hogue's 
"arguments for allowing withdrawal of his plea are not such as would compel a 
reasonable person of adequate means to bring at his own expense." (R., p.37.) The 
district court rejected Mr. Hague's argument that he had been denied access to counsel 
because he "failed to note even a single specific occasion upon which he asked to 
speak to his attorney, and was prevented from doing so within a reasonable period of 
time," and because "the jail notified his then-counsel ... that if he needed to speak with 
his client, he would need to visit him at the jail, as [Mr. Hague's] access to telephones 
and writing materials was restricted in accordance with the [behavior modification] plan." 
(R., p.37; see R., p.27.) 
That Mr. Hogue was not permitted access to a telephone or letter-
writing materials for an unknown period upon demand in order to speak 
with his counsel does not frame anything like a claim that he was denied 
access to counsel, and a reasonable person would not finance such a 
claim. 
(R., pp.37-38.) 
The district court also determined that "Mr. Hague's claim that he was denied 
access to legal mail is not one that a reasonable person would finance with his own 
money." (R., p.38.) "[Mr.] Hogue does not allege either that the officers failed to notify 
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him of the contents of the warrant [in the separate case], that he was prevented from 
reading the warrant, or that jail personnel failed to provide him with the warrant copies 
within a reasonable time after their delivery." (R., p.38.) The district court determined 
that Mr. Hogue "apparently believes that his rights were violated because he was 
prevented from taking immediate possession of [the warrant copies] when the officers 
came to the jail," which could not be developed into a meritorious claim even with the 
assistance of counsel. (R., p.38.) 
Further, the district court determined that, while Mr. Hogue alleged ineffective 
assistance by both of his attorneys, "[b]ecause the record supplied by Mr. Hogue on its 
face shows quite clearly that the defendant did not suffer a violation of his rights as 
claimed, no reasonable person would finance this claim with his or her money." 
(R., p.38.) In sum, the district court denied Mr. Hague's motion for the appointment of 
counsel.4 (R., p.38.) 
The district court also denied Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
(R., pp.39-40.) Because Mr. Hogue filed the motion to withdraw his guilty plea after he 
was sentenced, he had to show "manifest injustice" to withdraw the plea. {R., p.39.) 
4 Later, the district court issued an amended memorandum decision and order. 
(R., pp.136-43.) The district court amended the section denying the motion for the 
appointment of counsel "to include a citation to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals 
addressing the right to counsel in the context of a postjudgment motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea." (R., p.136.) The district court cited State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 458 
(Ct. App. 2010), where the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that "a post-judgment 
hearing upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment." (R., p.138 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).) 
Based on Hartshorn, the district court concluded that "while nothing prevents a criminal 
defendant from requesting counsel at public expense to represent him in connection 
with a with a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a trial court is not 
Constitutionally bound to grant the motion even if the defendant is indigent." (R., p.138 
(emphasis omitted).) The district court denied the motion for the appointment of 
counsel, because "the Court determines that this is not a critical stage of the criminal 
process." (R., p.139 (emphasis omitted).) 
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The district court observed that "manifest injustice" is shown where the plea was not 
knowing or voluntary. (See R., p.39.) According to the district court, Mr. Hogue failed to 
explain how the restrictions imposed by the behavior modification plan, or the fact that 
he did not immediately receive the warrant copies, "undermined the validity of his plea." 
(R., p.39.) The district court stated that Mr. Hogue did not provide any specific facts or 
evidence in support of his claims that he received harsh treatment or that his pre-
existing mental health issues made it extremely likely that his mental competency may 
have been diminished. (R., pp.39-40.) "In short, because [Mr. Hogue] has not framed 
even a colorable argument as to his claim that his plea was not given knowingly or 
voluntarily, the Court concludes that no manifest injustice has been shown or would 
result if the defendant were not permitted to withdraw his plea." (R., p.40.) 
Additionally, the district court denied Mr. Hogue's request for a hearing "because 
he has failed to present any claim which might be developed at such a hearing into one 
entitling him to the relief sought." (R., p.40.) 
Mr. Hogue then filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motions to Appoint Counsel, Withdraw 
Guilty Plea, and Set a Hearing.5 (R., pp.49-53.) 
5 Mr. Hogue subsequently filed a Renewed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R., pp.72-
73.) He also filed an affidavit and memorandum of law in support of the renewed 
motion. (R., pp.74-88.) The district court issued an order staying the renewed motion 
"pending the outcome of [Mr. Hogue's] direct appeal." (R., p.144.) Mr. Hogue then filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Staying Proceedings. (R., pp.148-51.) 
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration after finding the motion to be 
"utterly frivolous," and warned that "[a]ny further frivolous filings from Mr. Hogue will risk 
the imposition of sanctions." (R., pp.206-07.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hogue's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Mr. Hogue asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because he has shown that manifest injustice 
necessary to withdraw the plea existed. An appellate court reviews a district court's 
decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes, 
138 Idaho 761, 765 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
to withdraw defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The rule requires a more rigorous measure 
of proof for post-sentence motions. See State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 571 (2011 ). 
"A showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing." Id. 
"Because a guilty plea by a criminal defendant waives certain constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates 
that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Heredia, 
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007). "Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is not met." Id. 
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a 
three-part inquiry involving: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
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confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). "On appeal, Idaho law requires that 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record 
as a whole." Id. 
Mr. Hogue asserts that he has shown that manifest injustice necessary to 
withdraw the plea existed because his plea was not knowing or voluntary. His plea was 
not knowing or voluntary because he did not understand the consequences of pleading 
guilty. At the entry of plea hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the State requested 
that the sentence in this case would run concurrently to the sentence in the pending 
separate case involving possession of sexually exploitative materials. (No. 40005 
Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.10-20.) That request was part of a "global resolution" for both 
cases. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.13-16.) The separate case was still 
at the preliminary hearing stage. (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.13-14.) After 
the State explained the terms of the plea agreement, when the district court asked 
Mr. Hague's counsel whether that was also his understanding of the plea agreement, he 
replied, "It is, Your Honor." (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.4, Ls.9-11.) The district 
court then accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas in this case. (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 
2012, p.22, Ls.4-13.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court went over the terms of the plea 
agreement, including that Mr. Hague's "sentences were to be made concurrent to" the 
sentence in the separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.19.) 
The State notified the district court that it would stand by the plea agreement in this 
case even though Mr. Hogue had subsequently pleaded not guilty in the separate case: 
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Quite frankly, given that this was a global offer, Mr. Hogue did plead not 
guilty in the other case, we do believe we would have grounds to withdraw 
from that plea agreement and ask for more, if we so desired. However, I 
articulated that I was going to withdraw from that plea agreement and ask 
for more, if we so desired. However, I articulated that I was going to go 
ahead and follow that plea agreement anyway, not withdraw from it, 
because I believe-I believed, at the time, that it was the appropriate 
resolution of this case and, quite frankly, I still do. 
(No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.14, L.22-p.15, L.12.) 
After the district court heard argument from counsel and comments from 
Mr. Hogue, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay. I cannot order my sentence to be consecutive to a 
sentence that has not been imposed yet. I just want both parties to know 
that. I will put in the order, pursuant to the agreement between the 
parties, that the Court has no objection to it being made consecutive or-
or-or pardon me-concurrent, but that will be up to whoever imposes 
sentence in that case, should the defendant be found guilty. 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] And, Your Honor, I believe the parties did 
understand that at the time Mr. Hogue entered into his guilty plea in this 
case. The child porn case [(the separate case)] was still at the preliminary 
hearing when-
THE COURT: Okay. 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] -that was added in as a term. 
THE COURT: All right. 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] Just to-
THE COURT: I just wanted to be sure that that's clear on the record 
because of the Supreme Court's ruling you can't do that, you can't make 
something concurrent or consecutive to a sentence that has not yet 
been imposed. 
(No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.6.) The district court then imposed 
sentence. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.30, Ls.7-20.) "The Court has no objection to 
these sentences being concurrent with the sentence imposed in [the separate case], but 
that must be determined by the Judge in that case." (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.30, 
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Ls.21-24.) In the separate case, the district court imposed a sentence of six years 
indeterminate, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in this case. (No. 40273 
Tr., Aug. 15, 2012, p.23, Ls.6-15.) 
"Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, 
including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show ... [t]he defendant was 
informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum 
punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply." I.C.R. 11 (c)(2). A 
district court may not order that a defendant's sentences in two cases run concurrently, 
if the defendant has not yet been convicted in one of those cases. See I.C. § 18-308. 
Mr. Hogue submits that, because the district court accepted his guilty pleas 
without telling Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this 
case and the separate case run concurrently, he was not "informed of the 
consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other 
direct consequences which may apply." See I.C.R. 11 (c)(2). The district court did not 
tell Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and 
the separate case run concurrently. As discussed above, at the entry of plea hearing 
the State asked for the sentence in this case to run concurrently to the sentence in the 
pending separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.10-20.) That was also 
Mr. Hague's counsel's understanding of the plea agreement. ( See No. 40005 
Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.4, Ls.9-11.) Indeed, at the sentencing hearing the district court 
initially told Mr. Hogue that, as part of the plea agreement, "Your sentences were to be 
made concurrent" to the sentence in the separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, 
p.6, Ls.14-15.) Thus, the district court never told Mr. Hogue that it did not have 
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authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run 
concurrently. 
During the sentencing hearing the State alleged that, at the time Mr. Hogue 
pleaded guilty in this case, the parties understood that the district court did not have 
authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run 
concurrently. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.29, Ls.19-22.) However, the record belies 
this allegation. Nothing in the transcript of the entry of plea hearing indicates that the 
parties, to say nothing of Mr. Hogue, understood that the district court did not have 
authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run 
concurrently. The State requested that the sentence in this case "run concurrent to [the 
separate case] that Mr. Hogue has currently pending." (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, 
p.2, Ls.10-13.) The State made a direct request for this, and did not couch its request in 
terms of asking the district court to have no objection to the sentence in this case 
running concurrently. Additionally, Mr. Hague's counsel told the district court that that 
was also his understanding of the plea agreement. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, 
p.4, Ls.9-11.) Further, when the district court accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas, it did 
not inform Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this 
case and the separate case run concurrently. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.22, 
Ls.4-14.) Thus, nothing on the record indicates that the parties understood that the 
district court did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and the 
separate case run concurrently. 
Because the district court accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas without telling the 
parties that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and the 
separate case run concurrently, Mr. Hogue was not informed of the consequences of 
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the plea. Thus, Mr. Hague's plea was not knowing or voluntary because he did not 
understand the consequences of pleading guilty. See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484. 
Because Mr. Hague's plea was not knowing or voluntary, he has shown that manifest 
injustice necessary to withdraw his plea after sentencing existed. See Flowers, 150 
Idaho at 571. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Hayes, 138 Idaho at 765. 
Mr. Hague's judgment of conviction should be vacated and his case should be 
remanded with direction to permit him to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Hogue respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
judgment of conviction and remand the case with direction to permit him to withdraw his 
plea of guilty. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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